Mayor-elect John Cranley says he supports a $10-$15 million so-called trackless trolley system that he claims is a suitable replacement to the $133 million streetcar project. But when looking at the data, Cranley’s claims appear far-fetched.
Of course, that hasn’t stopped Cranley or The Cincinnati Enquirer from delving into a false equivalency for the debate. That’s to both their benefits: For Cranley, if both the streetcar and trackless trolley are given equal weight, then the city would be seemingly dumb to pursue a project with 12 times the cost. For The Enquirer, it allows reporters and editors to perpetuate controversies and “debates” in the comments section of their website that bring much-needed revenue and traffic.
But this isn’t some new, uncharted area of public policy. Cities and developers around the country studied and pursued both streetcars and trackless trolleys in the past. The results: Streetcars are much better drivers of economic growth and development, while trackless trolleys typically fall flat.
Portland, Ore., Mayor Charlie Hales wrote one of the best analyses on the issue in 2007. Hales looked at studies and city-by-city data and found big transit projects, particularly light rail, caused significant property value increases — as high as 39 percent — near rail lines in Dallas, St. Louis, Portland and San Francisco, among other cities.
On the other hand, Hales found that, with the exception of Denver, trackless trolleys and other conventional bus systems rarely resulted in economic development and mostly underwhelmed in terms of ridership.
The findings are even more compelling because they match exactly what residents and business owners building along the planned streetcar route have been saying. The owners of Taste of Belgium, Zula and Park + Vine iterated some similar arguments to CityBeat for a previous story.
“Once you get the track on the ground, that really means there’s a commitment to the neighborhood,” said Jean-Francois Flechet, owner of restaurant Taste of Belgium. “You can no longer change the route, like a bus can be rerouted. A streetcar, you cannot change it.”
Businesses don’t like uncertainty. They know that bus routes — even if they’re glorified enough to earn the “trolley” label — can change, and that uncertainty makes investment along any bus or trolley route unlikely. But because streetcar tracks are reliably set, they can spur real, substantial investment.
What’s even more bizarre is that, as The Enquirer’s story points out, the latest estimate for the trolley system puts its operating cost at more than $4 million a year — slightly more than the latest $3-$4 million estimate for the streetcar.
In terms of costs, Cranley’s strongest argument against the streetcar project is the operating budget deficit it would add. The streetcar system would add roughly 1 percent in expenditures to the operating budget. That’s a lot of money for a budget that’s been structurally imbalanced since 2001.
But if the trackless trolley system will have the same effect on the operating budget, the real issue is how each system will impact the capital budget while producing a reasonable return on investment.
In that comparison, it’s hard to draw a scenario in which the streetcar doesn’t win. Based on Hales’ analysis, a trackless trolley system would have limited or perhaps no return on investment. Meanwhile, a 2007 study from consulting firm HDR found Cincinnati’s streetcar line would produce a 2.7-to-1 return on investment over 35 years. (The 2007 study is now outdated, but the gist of the findings is soundly supported by other cities’ experiences and Hales’ analysis.)
The comparison gets even worse for the trackless trolley system when considering that half the streetcar’s upfront costs are effectively paid at this point. The city already spent $23 million as of September, and another $43 million will be financed through federal grants. That means the city’s remaining share is only $67 million — roughly half of the current $133 million estimate for the project.
In fairness, the trolley system is cheaper, at $10-$15 million, and would cover much more ground at first than the streetcar’s 3.6-mile loop around Over-the-Rhine and downtown. But that lower cost and more expansive route has no empirically backed return on investment, while the streetcar absolutely does.
So if the transit choice under a Cranley administration is between the trolley system and nothing, the empirical evidence shows nothing is likely a much better value. But streetcar supporters are hoping those aren’t the only options Cincinnati will be given once the new City Council and mayor take office in December.
CONTACT GERMAN LOPEZ: glopez@citybeat.com or
@germanrlopez
This article appears in Nov 20-26, 2013.


